《The Economist》《经济学人》中文版
ecocn · yeahbabya · 2007-08-21
<< 莱克星顿:
|
首 页
|
白宫:再见,建筑师 >>
金融公司:假日恐慌
2007-08-21
[2007.08.04]The effect on financial firms: Holiday horrors
The effect on financial firms
金融公司受到影响
Holiday horrors
假日恐慌
Aug 2nd 2007 | NEW YORK
From The Economist print edition
There are losers, but some winners too
几家欢喜几家愁
“I KEEP thinking how nice it would be to turn off my computer and not
come back until September,” says the head of leveraged-lending (杠杆收购)
at a large bank. As the spasms in the credit markets claim more
casualties, and unsold bonds and loans for funding leveraged buyouts
pile up, wails of pain are echoing across Wall Street and beyond. But
they are interrupted by the occasional hoot of pleasure.
“我一直在想,关掉电脑,出去度假,九月再回来,该多好啊。”一家大银行杠杆借贷部门的职员说。随着信贷市场收缩造成了更多损失,未售出的债券和支持杠杆收购的贷款大量积压,华尔街内外回响着痛苦的哭泣。但其中也不时地有欣喜的欢笑。
Start with the victims. For private-equity firms new deals are suddenly
harder to do and existing ones costlier to refinance. Their mega-funds
may struggle to deploy their estimated $300 billion-500 billion of
financial muscle. This could scupper Kohlberg Kravis Roberts's hopes of
following Blackstone to the stockmarket. KKR looks particularly
vulnerable because it is less diversified than its arch-rival in the
leveraged-buyout business.
从受害者说起。对私募股权公司来说,达成交易突然变得更加困难,现有交易贷款重组更加昂贵。大型集资要部署据估计高达3千亿到5千亿的资金,决非易事。这
可能会使Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts继黑石之后进入股市的希望落空。KKR看似尤为脆弱,因为与其杠杆收购业务中的主要竞争对手相比,其多样化程度较差。
As credit for buyouts dries up, the biggest losers are the banks left
holding “hung bridges”. These are loans to buyers that were supposed to
be temporary and for which the banks charged fees. As the price of the
loans falls in the secondary market—to below 85% of their value in some
cases—a number of banks could face big losses. To add to their woes,
private-equity clients are also more likely to tap undrawn loan
facilities which were negotiated some time ago on more favourable terms.
随着收购的信贷干涸,最大的输家是那些留下来收拾残局的银行。贷款的往往是一些临时的买家,由银行为他们支付费用。随着贷款的价格在二级市场下跌 –
在某些情况下,跌至低于其实际价值的85% -
一些银行就可能面临巨大损失。私墓股权的客户也更有可能会动用早前以优惠条款谈妥的尚未提取的,贷款抵押设施。
Some of these risks can be hedged in the derivatives markets. But with
a backlog of more than $300 billion, banks may end up selling loans at
a discount to make room on their books for new commitments. According
to the head of a hedge fund that does a lot of business with large
banks, their lending desks are now being stripped of risk-management
responsibilities by livid chief executives.
一些风险在衍生品市场产生。但是有3千多亿美元作为后盾,银行可以最终可以进行低息贷款,好在账本上腾出空间,接纳新的存款。根据与大银行有着密切业务往来的一家对冲基金主管称,执行总裁气急败坏,他们借贷部的风险管理职能正在降低。
One boss who is probably more embarrassed than angry is Citigroup's
Chuck Prince. His recent comment that the bank was “still dancing” in
the loan markets has quickly returned to haunt him. Citi is the most
exposed of all banks, having “tried to buy the market at the worst of
times”, as one competitor puts it. It was the lead arranger on $25
billion of the roughly $40 billion of bonds and loans withdrawn in
recent weeks. Things may get worse: Citi is involved in financing some
giant buyouts still to come to the market, such as TXU, a Texas
energy-utility, and First Data, which processes credit cards.
一位老板可能尴尬多于愤怒,他就是花旗银行的Chuck
Prince。他近来评论说银行在借贷市场“一如既往地舞动”,这一评论很快反过来让他自己寝食难安。正如其竞争者所说,花旗是银行中最为暴露的,已“尝
试过在最坏的年代买进市场。”近几周内撤回的价值约400亿美元的债券和贷款当中,就有250亿是由花旗安排的。情况还可能进一步恶化:花旗参与一些即将
面市的大型杠杆收购的融资,如田纳西能源应用公司TXU,加工信用卡的First Data。
Citi should be able to take the losses in its stride, given its
enormous balance sheet and low cost of funds (thanks to cheap deposit
funding). But most investment banks do not have the luxury of also
being a big universal bank. No longer happy to act mainly as middlemen,
many have wanted a slice of the action themselves. Wall Street's five
big investment banks—Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch,
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns—have piled into potentially illiquid
(and thus risky) assets, from bridge loans to collateralised-debt
obligations (pools of tranched debt), over the past three years. Their
lending commitments rose from around $50 billion in 2002 to over $180
billion in 2006, according to Moody's, a credit-rating agency. In
Merrill Lynch's case, these commitments far exceed the bank's capital
base—although they also include safe loans to blue-chip companies.
拥有巨大平衡帐簿和低成本基金(由于存款集资成本较低)的花旗,在大步前进的过程中应该能够消化这些损失。但是许多投资银行不敢奢望称霸全球。很多却已不
愿只是牵线搭桥,转而想从中分一杯羹。华尔街的五大投资银行——高盛、摩根斯坦利、美林、雷曼兄弟和贝尔史登——已经在囤积未来三年内的潜在非流动资产
(风险资产),从桥梁贷款到债务抵押债券。据信用评级公司穆迪称,他们的借贷承诺从2002年的约500亿美元上升到2006年的1800多亿美元。在美
林的案例当中,这些承诺远远超过银行的资本基础——虽然他们也包括了针对蓝筹公司的安全贷款。
Buying shares of an investment bank today is “more of a religious
experience—one based on faith—than an investment”, says Dick Bove, of
Punk Ziegel, an investment bank. Bear Stearns's shareholders have had
their faith severely tested. Two of the bank's hedge funds have
imploded and a third has stopped investors from withdrawing funds. Even
more vulnerable are stand-alone hedge funds that borrow heavily to
dabble in debt. As easy financing evaporates, investors want their
money back and the prime-brokerage units of banks that lend to them
want more collateral, or “margin”. Credit funds were up by a mere 0.2%
in June, according to Credit Suisse. Returns in July are expected to be
negative.
今天购买投资银行的股份“与其说是投资,还不如说是一项以信念为基础的宗教活动。”Punk Ziegel投资银行的Dick
Bove如是说。贝尔史登股东们的信念就受到了严重考验。银行的两大对冲基金已经发生内爆,第三个已阻止投资者撤资。更加脆弱的是那些独立的对冲基金,它
们过度举债,重负不堪。随着融资不再轻松,投资者想要回资金,借给投资者钱的银行经纪部门想要更多的抵押,或者“利润”。瑞士信贷显示,信贷基金在六月间
仅仅上升了0.2%。七月份,信贷基金的回报估计为负。
Highly leveraged funds sink quickly in such choppy markets. Witness the
demise of Sowood Capital, a $3 billion fund that lost half its value in
short order and this week sold its credit holdings at a discount to
Citadel, another hedge fund. Sowood was caught out in two ways: it
over-borrowed and its hedges failed to neutralise its risks as
expected. The debacle suggests that even the canniest of investors can
slip up: the managers of Harvard's successful endowment have lost $350m
investing in Sowood, according to reports.
高级杠杆基金很快陷入这样的牛皮市中。眼见对冲基金Sowood倒闭,30亿美元的基金转眼之间就损失了一半,本周赔本将其所持信贷卖给另一家对冲基金
Citadel。Sowood在两方面出了事:它举债过度,且对冲基金未能如愿化解风险。这次灾难表明即使是最精明的投资者也会栽:据报道,哈佛成功捐赠
的管理者投资Sowood已经损失了3亿5千万美元。
The intervention of Citadel—which last year snapped up bits of
Amaranth, another troubled hedge fund—is seen by some as encouraging.
It suggests that large, diversified funds will not only survive, but
could prosper by swooping on assets they consider cheap. The top 20 or
so funds, including Citadel, have the reputation (and pay big enough
fees) to negotiate hard for more flexible financing arrangements. So
they are less likely to get caught out.
Citadel的介入——它于去年拿下了另一家举步维艰的对冲基金Amaranth——有人看作是鼓舞人心的。这表明大型多样化的基金不仅会生存下来,还
将会兴旺发达,收购廉价资产就是发展之道。排名前20左右的基金,包括Citadel,都有足够的信誉和资金作为谈判的后盾,已取得更加灵活的融资计划。
所以它们出事的可能性较小。
Short on the problem
问题不大
Smaller funds can prosper too. Paulson & Co, a fund based in New
York, has done well from betting early that securities backed by
subprime mortgages would fall in value. The good times may continue for
other funds that are “short” on subprime.
小型基金同样可以繁荣。一家总部位于纽约的基金Paulson & Co,早就笃信次级抵押支持的有价证券会贬值,所以业绩斐然。在次级抵押市场投入较少的基金,好光景还会继续。
But there are signs that the pain is spreading to other countries.
Several European banks and insurers are rumoured to be sitting on
“mortgage bombs”—troubled assets linked to America's subprime mess. IKB
Deutsche Industriebank, which lends money to Germany's middle-sized
companies, is being bailed out by a group of banks including the
state-owned bank that partly owns it, thanks to ill-judged punts on
American mortgages. And Australia's Macquarie Bank, which has been
growing rapidly and buying up big infrastructure projects, has said two
of its funds may post losses because of subprime woes.
但有迹象表明痛苦正在向别国散播。有谣言说,数家欧洲银行和保险公司都因为投资了抵押贷款,如坐针毡——和美国混乱的次级抵押有关的资产都麻烦缠身。
IKB德国工业银行,贷款给德国中型公司,现在正靠数家银行(包括拥有其部分所有权的国有银行)帮忙才能自保,都是对美国次级抵押市场判断失误惹的祸。澳
大利亚的Macquarie银行,一直以来增长迅速,将多个大型基础设施项目全部买下。该银行称它有两家基金可能会因次级抵押市场的危机而遭受损失。
One German bank, however, is doing well out of the subprime mess. After
one of its analysts predicted two years ago that a slump was coming,
Deutsche Bank piled into derivatives contracts that gain in value as
the housing market sinks. These bets are thought to have netted the
bank at least $250m, perhaps much more.
然而,德意志银行避开了次级抵押市场的混乱,大赚了一笔。该行一名职员曾预测到两年之后的这场大萧条,此后德意志银行囤积的衍生工具合同在房市低迷之际身价倍增。这些赌注被认为为该行赚取了至少2亿5千万美元,甚至可能更多。
But it is traders of distressed corporate debt who are wearing the
broadest smiles. After four years of infuriatingly strong markets, they
finally have wads of discounted bonds and loans to feed on. Goldman
Sachs, for one, has upped the size of a junk debt-fund it is raising,
from $12.5 billion to $20 billion.
但是正是那些一蹶不振的公司债券的交易者带着最为灿烂的笑容。股市疯长四年之后,最终有了他们想要的贴现债券和贷款。高盛积累的垃圾债券总额已从125亿美元上升到200亿美元。
Though the mood has clearly darkened, no one really knows if this is
the crunch that the markets have been anticipating. As Stephen Green,
boss of HSBC, a global bank with copious subprime troubles, put it this
week: “It is too early to tell if this is a temporary bout of
indigestion or whether a whole new pricing structure will have
established itself when people get back from their holidays.” Turn off
the computer, head to the beach, and hope.
虽然心情着实不佳,没有人真正知道是否这就是市场一直以来期望出现的杂音。正如饱受次级抵押市场危机之苦的全球性大银行,汇丰银行的总裁斯蒂芬.格林本周
所说:“要说这是暂时的消化不良还为时尚早,说不定全新的价格结构会在人们度假回家之前就建立起来。”关上电脑,怀揣这个愿望,到海滩度假去吧。
相关文章:
啤酒行业,危机四伏
2007-12-24
老得快,爱得苦,死得早
2007-10-21
评:中澳颁布应对全球变暖问题新政策
2007-06-13
2007-05-14
2007-05-14
[2007.3.30]中国政府倡导的乳制品狂热正在"变味"
2007-04-09
收藏到:
Del.icio.us
引用地址:
发表于
09:38
|
编辑
|
继续话题
|
转发
|
推荐
发表评论
原始快照:web.archive.org