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都市村庄 建筑师的个人空间----------------- 主页地址：http://urban.blogbus.com <<<中国的军力现状（三） | Main | 中国的军力现状（四） 时间: 2004-10-18 中国的军力现状（四） Frank W Moore POTENTIAL CHINESE USES OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN 中国可能对台湾采取的军事行动 The West concern about China's military capability is focused mainly on potential military action against Taiwan. China has threatened to take military action if Taiwan declares independence from the mainland or indefinitely prolongs the unification process. While the modernization of China military forces currently under way may facilitate a potential attack on Taiwan, it does not make success a forgone conclusion for the foreseeable future. Reviewing potential uses of armed force by China, this section concludes not only that Chinese capabilities are limited now, but also that given the slow pace of modernization, China's capabilities for attack on Taiwan are likely to remain limited for the next 10-15 years. 西方对中国军事实力的忧虑主要集中在可能对台湾采取的军事行动。中国已经威胁如果台湾宣布从大陆独立，或者无限期拖延统一进程，它将会采取军事行动。尽管中国军队目前正在进行的现代化进程可能会使其具备军事打击台湾的潜力，但在可预见的近期，这并不能在使获得胜利成为一个必然的结论。回顾中国以往使用武装力量的情况，这个章节的结论是：不但中国目前军事实力有限，而且考虑到其缓慢的现代化步伐，中国在未来１０～１５年内攻击台湾的能力都将非常有限。 Combined Arms Attack and Invasion 联合军事打击和进攻 In theory, China could launch a combined arms amphibious and airborne assault on Taiwan. China current forces do not include enough transport assets to accomplish such a task, however; and there is no evidence that China is building up larger numbers of amphibious assault ships or large cargo aircraft. Current military doctrine calls for a 5-to-1 attacker to defender ratio for amphibious assaults. Today China can only transport 1 armored or 3 infantry brigades with its amphibious ships, which would be completely inadequate for an attack on Taiwan. The use of commercial and fishing vessels (for example, splitting a company of troops among 4 fishing trawlers) could not substitute effectively due to communication problems and the resulting inability to coordinate units. An amphibious assault would only be conducted with control the skies over the Strait, which the Chinese Air Force probably cannot accomplish. The weather and terrain of Taiwan favors the defender, with high waves and wind in the Taiwan Strait, combined with cliffs on the eastern part of Taiwan and expansive mudflats on the western coast. Finally, Taiwan and the United States could see an invasion coming many months before the event, because it would take that long to prepare if China did have the forces to attempt the effort. 理论上，中国可以对台湾发动一场联合部队两栖登陆和空降袭击，但是以中国现在的力量无法提供足够的交通工具来执行这样的任务，而且也没有证据表明中国目前正在建造更多的两栖攻击舰或大型运输飞机。目前的军事理论认为在两栖登陆作战中，攻击方与防守方的兵力比例需要达到五比一的水平。现在中国的两栖船只只能运送一个装甲旅或三个步兵旅的兵力，这对于进攻台湾是完全不够的。使用商船或渔船（例如：将一个连的部队分散装载在４艘拖网渔船上）也因为通讯问题及其导致的无法相互配合而不是一个有效的替代。一场两栖作战只有在控制整个海峡空域的情况下才能有效进行，而这也可能是中国空军所无力实现的。台湾的气候和地理条件也对防御者有利，台湾海峡风浪很大，东海岸是悬崖峭壁，西海岸是广阔的泥滩。最后，台湾和美国可能在之前数个月就发现可能的入侵行动，因为中国就算有力量来进行这种努力也需要那么长的时间来做准备。 Missile Attack 导弹攻击 China could attack Taiwan with a few hundred DF-15 and DF-11 conventionally armed missiles; but history suggests that such an attack would probably not force Taipei to capitulate (compare, for example, Britain in 1944-45, or Serbia in 1999). These missiles are not accurate enough to be precision weapons against airfields, radar, transport nodes, etc. They would have to be used more as a terror weapon, against cities and town. if only conventional warheads were used, damage would not be any more significant than that from a large natural disaster, such as the one Taiwan survived in 1999 (a major earthquake near Taipei). Since China only has a limited number of DF-15 and DF-11 missiles, a long-lasting missile siege would be difficult. 中国可能会用几百枚东风－１５型和东风－１１型常规导弹来攻击台湾，但历史经验表明这种攻击可能不足以让台北屈服（例如比较一下１９４４～４５年的英国，或是１９９９年的塞尔维亚）。这些导弹的准确程度不足以做为精确制导武器打击机场、雷达、交通枢纽等等。它们将更可能被当作一种恐吓武器来打击城市和村镇。如果仅使用常规弹头，其能够造成的损害将不可能比一场大规模的自然灾害，例如１９９９年台湾经历的那场（台北市附近的大地震）更严重。 Blockade 封锁 China's navy could attempt to blockade Taiwan, forcing ships to dock at Chinese ports before proceeding on to the island. If the number of China's large surface ships (frigates and destroyers) continues to increase, such a blockade would be easier. China currently has more ships than Taiwan, and could attempt to enforce a blockade with a combination of naval vessels and mines. And despite the lack of sophistication of China's submarines, Taiwan has limited ASW assets to counter China's large submarine fleet. As with a missile attack, a blockade would bring international condemnation and, as a result, hurt China's economy, even if it were technically legal under international law (with Taiwan recognized as part of China). 中国的海军可以试图封锁台湾，迫使船只在到达这个岛屿之前前往中国的港口停靠。如果中国大型水面舰艇（驱逐舰和护卫舰）的数量继续上升，这样的封锁将会更容易。中国的军舰数目前比台湾多，并且可能会联合使用海军舰艇和水雷来加强封锁。此外，尽管中国缺乏精密的潜艇，台湾只有有限的反潜工具来面对中国庞大的潜艇舰队。同导弹攻击相比，封锁有可能造成国际制裁，并伤害中国的经济，尽管从技术上讲（封锁）是符合国际法规定的（如果把台湾认为是中国的一部分）。 CONCLUSIONS 结论 China's military is modernizing, but there are distinct limits to the modernization program. First, the current force structure is so old that the rate of retirement will exceed the rate of acquisition in all major weapons categories, with the possible exception of major surface combatants. This means that the size of China's armed forces will continue a recent pattern of decline, and to drop quite steeply in some cases, such as combat aircraft. The only exception may be China's surface combat ships. 中国的军力正在走向现代化，但在其现代化计划中存在着明显的缺陷，首先，目前的军力结构是如此陈旧，以致于在所有领域主战武器退役的速度都超过了获取新装备的速度。这意味着中国武装力量的规模将会继续保持最近的缩减趋势，而且在某些情况下会严重下降。例如作战飞机。可能唯一的例外是中国的水面舰艇。 Second, the modernization is proceeding slowly and in a piecemeal manner. All military forces take a significant amount of time to integrate new weapon systems into its forces; for China the process seems to take longer than most. 其次，现代化进程进行地缓慢而又零碎。任何军队都需要花费大量的时间来将新武器系统整合到自己的武装力量中，但是在中国这个过程比任何人都长。 Third, China is adding only a handful of modern systems to its inventory. New systems are purchased in small batches or singly, which is cannot dramatically change the balance of power. Moreover, while "modern" relative to existing Chinese systems, current acquisitions from Russia are not as capable as the comparable systems fielded by the United States or even Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan (in some areas). 第三，中国只是把数量有限的现代化系统投入部署。新武器系统的采购量仅仅是小批量或个位数，这不会戏剧性地改变力量的平衡。此外，“现代化”也是相对于中国现有的装备而言，目前从俄罗斯的订货同美国，甚至是日本、南韩、或台湾（在某些领域）所部署的系统相比就不那么先进了。 Finally, China's military modernization plan has highlighted the inability of the indigenous arms industry in China to produce the advanced technology weapon systems that the military wants. The recent return to dependence on foreign assistance specifically, aircraft and naval vessels from Russia, and technical assistance from Israel) runs contrary to the Chinese government's desire to fully control its own military destiny. 最后，中国的军事现代化计划反衬出中国国内的兵器工业无法制造出军队所想要的高技术武器系统。最近这种转向依赖于外来帮助的行动（更详细地说，从俄罗斯获得的飞机和海军舰艇，从以色列获得的技术帮助）与中国政府希望完全控制自己的军事能力的想法背道而驰。 China may eventually change its policies and invest more financial resources in military modernization; but for the foreseeable future, China's potential for military action in Taiwan and other areas will remain limited. China may take a more active military role in its region, but the overall balance of power in East Asia will remain unchanged. 中国也许最终会改变其政策，在军事现代化方面投入更多的资金，但在可预见的将来，中国对台湾动武的潜力仍然将十分有限。中国可能会在本地区发挥更大的军事作用，但是整个东亚地区的力量平衡将会保持不变。 Endnotes 注释 1 William Arkin, "Nuclear Notebook: Chinese nuclear forces, 1999," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 55, No. 4(May/June 1999). 2 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, ibid, and Federation of American Scientists website:http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china /icbm/index.html. 3 Doug Thacher, "IDDS Web Report: Chinese Naval Forces 2000," referencing news report FBIS-CHI-1999-1207, Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies website:http://www.idds.org/idds-mainpages /database/samples-database/china/chinesenavalforces2000.html (May 2000). 4 IDDS estimates a continued high level of holdings for China's tanks and combat aircraft due to the continued presence of those systems in China's inventory. IDDS holdings estimates do not reflect the readiness status or maintenance of the weapon systems; they indicate the total number of systems at military bases around the country. Some Chinese weapon systems may not have been used in years, having been placed in storage areas. For example some J-6s (MiG-19) sit on airfield tarmacs for months at a time; many of these aircraft may not be in flying condition. 5 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 1999-2000, p.186. 6 Ibid. 7 Jane's Armour and Artillery 1999-2000, p. 4. 8 IDDS shows a high level of retention for older Chinese aircraft, especially the J-6, because the rate of retirement is not known. The numbers of active units for these aircraft may be much lower. 9 Randall Forsberg, ed. The Arms Production Dilemma: Contraction and Restraint in the World Combat Aircraft Industry (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1994), p. 243. 10 Washington Post, "Russians help China modernize its arsenal", p. A17, 2/10/2000. 11 While the Israeli AWAC aircraft is based on the Il-76, the United States is trying to block the sale of the plane to China on the grounds that the radar contains restricted U. S. components. (Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1999-2000, p. 354). 12 Jane's Fighting Ships 1999-2000, p. 118. 13 IDDS Database of World Arms Holdings, Production, and Trade 1972-2000, with Projections to 2010, April 2000. 14 Agence France Presse (AFP), "China's first aircraft carrier", 1/12/00. 15 Jane's Fighting Ships 1999-2000, p. 119. 16 AFP, "China's first aircraft carrier", 1/12/00. 17 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 'Ta Kung Pao' web site, Hong Kong, 2/15/00, 2/17/00. 作者：Frank W Moore防务与裁军研究学院（Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies）研究员 翻译：万维防务评论 摘自：万维防务评论 Posted by 无名 @ 2004-10-18 21:56 Trackback(0) 评论 Add Comment 最后更新 中国的军力现状（四） 中国的军力现状（三） 中国的军力现状（二） 中国的军力现状（一） 清东陵---简妮逍遥游 草图不可草 上海久百城市广场 安藤谈盖里 沸腾的天际线 朝鲜游记