关于中国3G License 的客观预测 :: 旁观者清

关于中国3G License 的客观预测 3G LICENSING IN CHINA: A WAITING GAME Summit Fails to Deliver Clear Path to 3G Despite the fact that in April 2004, Minister Wang Xudong, the minister heading up the Chinese telecoms industry regulator, the Ministry of Information Industry ("MII"), had set out to damp down rumours and speculation in the market by indicating that MII was in no hurry to issue the first third generation ("3G") licences or to impose any particular technology standard, expectations were still (as in previous years) running high at the fifth 3G Mobile International Summit China (the "Summit") held last week in Beijing. Attendees were hoping that there would be an announcement, or perhaps even just a hint as to when the first such 3G licences would be issued in China.  However, the MII Vice-Minister Lou Qinjian gave no further clues and maintained the stance that the MII was still researching 3G technologies and studying the lessons learned from 3G deployments in other countries. Why the prolonged waiting game? It is clear that China wants to avoid making the same mistakes as were made in terms of the management of the 3G licensing process elsewhere in the world.  China is also different from other mobile markets: an auction of licenses makes little sense when the major basic telecom carriers are at least majority state owned.  Regulators are also concerned about whether there are enough high-end subscribers able to afford sophisticated 3G services.  MII will be carefully watching developments in Hong Kong, where Hutchison Telecom is rolling out its 3G offering, to see how the deployment process pans out technically and commercially.  In addition, delaying the launch of 3G allows time for the testing of the domestic Chinese TD-SCDMA (Time Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access) standard which has not, unlike the European standard W-CDMA and the US developed CDMA 2000, been commercially deployed in other markets. What Needs to Happen Before 3G licensing? There will be many factors affecting the timing of MII's decision to issue 3G licences in China: firstly, MII will be keen to ensure that the home-grown TD-SCDMA technology is seen as a viable technical option and the commencement of licensing is likely to be contingent on the satisfactory resolution of any significant glitches encountered during TD-SCDMA field testing.  It is reported that all the major telecom carriers making up the so-called "5 + 1" industry model in China (China Netcom, China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom and China Railcom + China Satellite) are currently engaged in TD-SCDMA testing, but with varying degrees of enthusiasm, given that some carriers' existing business model would naturally lead them to migrate to a particular standard.  Second, rumours abound of further consolidation within the industry which could also impact on choices of technology standards.  Third, there may be some hesitation about launching 3G services before the main piece of the telecoms regulatory framework, the PRC Telecommunications Law, some ten years in the making, is in place.   What is clear is that if given a free hand in terms of procurement, choice of technology will be driven primarily by factors such as maturity and reliability of the technology, compatibility with existing network equipment deployed both inside and outside of China, and migration costs. No Imposed Choice of Standards At the Summit in Beijing, MII Vice-Minister Lou Qinjian reiterated that China was in no hurry to issue licenses, but did note that carriers would be free to choose their particular technology from the three ITU-approved standards (W-CDMA, CDMA 2000 and TD-SCDMA). While this further confirmation that a mandatory adoption of TD-SCDMA is not planned for the time being may have come as a relief to carriers who might otherwise have had to grapple with difficult and costly migration paths and systems integration issues, it leaves questions as to the future market for TD-SCDMA products.  Furthermore, the MII announcement does not exclude the possibility that domestic carriers, particularly those aspiring towards a coveted mobile licence, will still come under intense behind-the-scenes pressure to adopt the home-grown TD-SCDMA standard.  The decision to delay licensing by MII also leaves the equipment makers in something of a quandary, not knowing the extent to which they need to get on board the TD-SCDMA "train" in terms of R&D and manufacturing.  Major international networking equipment suppliers like Alcatel, Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia, and Nortel Networks, as well as newer domestic entrants like ZTE and Huawei have already spent a lot of time and energy on establishing 3G R&D facilities in China.  Many are already producing 3G equipment, but would have to retool production if it became clear that TD-SCDMA were to enjoy a privileged market position in China, as its promoters Datang Communications and Siemens are hoping. 3G and "Little Smart" When 3G licensing finally arrives, it is expected that the dominant fixed-line carriers China Telecom and China Netcom will receive 3G mobile licences.  Neither of these carriers currently has a mobile licence, but have nevertheless deployed highly popular limited mobility Personal Access System ("PAS") networks, known as "Xiaolingtong" or "little smart", based on the rather flimsy argument that they do not require a mobile license since Xiaolingtong relies on fixed line technology.  The most recent official catalogue of telecom services issued by MII in February of 2003 is, like its predecessors, completely silent on the regulatory status of Xiaolingtong while providing a highly detailed technical description of 3G mobile services. However, recent telephone enquiries as to Xiaolingtong's regulatory status with MII were met with the somewhat unconvincing response that for regulatory purposes Xiaolingtong is treated as a fixed-line wireless access service, hence there is no regulatory issue with regard to mobile licensing.  Once China Telecom and China Netcom are licensed to provide mobile services, a further clarification of Xiaolingtong's role in the regulatory puzzle may be forthcoming.  However, Xiaolingtong services are unlikely to threaten 3G service providers; Xiaolingtong targets low end users and so represents a different segment of the market from the high end users able to buy 3G handsets. Concluding Thoughts The current thinking, which, admittedly, is little more than informed guesswork at this stage, is that 3G licences may not be awarded until the second half of next year.  This means that given the time to market and allowing for a year or two to deploy the 3G networks and to write the applications, we may be looking at 2007 before a full-blown commercial service is available in China. Notwithstanding the uncertainty in relation to 3G, there are positive developments just over the horizon in terms of the opening up of China's telecoms services market to foreign investment. On 11 December of this year, two important changes will come about. The maximum foreign equity stake in a basic mobile data or voice services joint venture in China will hit its ultimate threshold of 49%, as per China's WTO commitments, whilst the first tranche of the phased liberalisation of the basic domestic and international (voice, packet and circuit switched data, fax, (domestic) private leased circuit and international closed user group voice and data) services will kick in on the same date, allowing a maximum 25% foreign equity interest, eventually rising to 49% on 11 December 2007, six years after China's WTO accession. With further liberalisation in the pipeline, rapid economic growth underpinning exponential mobile subscriber growth (from 85 million subscribers in 2000 to some 295 million mobile subscribers as at April 2004, according to MII statistics), and with the number of mobile subscribers having already surpassed the number of fixed-line subscribers, then even if 3G licensing is not just round the corner, in a country of 1.3 billion people with such a low overall mobile penetration rate, China is not a market that industry participants can easily ignore. dlson

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